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1. Introduction.   The following is a call for philosophers to contribute to the task of developing 
a subfield of philosophy of science that at present barely exists into a flourishing subfield. It is a 
field that has the potential to combine contributions from the science and values literature and from 
formal epistemology, and it is a field in which philosophers have an opportunity to be of use to 
scientists. It has a rich history, some of which will be mentioned below, but it deserves a richer 
future. 
 
The topic is context of scientific communication, a context distinction from our familiar contexts 
of justification and discovery, and from the context of pursuit. Its central questions are:  
Once an experiment is done, and the data has been analyzed, what should a scientist report, and 
how?   
 
This is not a simple question. The scientist wants (or should want) to convey what has been learned. 
This often involves a very complex and nuanced epistemic state. It is not clear that we have, as 
yet, the tools available for concisely conveying a nuanced state of this type. 
 
Our language lends itself most naturally to communicating our epistemic states via  statements that 
one has an appropriate epistemic attitude towards: knowledge, or belief, or acceptance. This is far 
too crude, and can sow confusion. The debate over the suitability of representing scientific results 
as a list of statements accepted or rejected has an extensive history, with parallel instantiations 
among statisticians and philosophers (albeit a history that has been misunderstood in recent years).  
I discuss this in Section 3, below. 
 
If acceptance is to rejected, in favour of a more nuanced representation that captures gradations of 
uncertainty, what is to take its place? An obvious choice is via credence functions, or subjective 
probabilities, assigning numerical degrees of belief to propositions. This can be a useful tool, but 
it also has its limitations. 
 
The appropriate attitude to take, is pluralist: there is no single technique that is appropriate for all 
situations. In Section 4 I will sketch a framework that is friendly to such pluralism, at the expense 
of being somewhat cumbersome and artificial.  I do so with two motivations. One is to motivate 
philosophers who find the framework attractive to work on elaborating it. The other is to motivate 
philosophers who are repelled by it to develop something better.  
 
First, some examples to help the reader get a sense of the sorts of problems to be dealt with. 
 
2. Examples 
 2.1.  Global temperature records. Consider the following, apparently similar, and apparently 
simple questions: 
 
1) As of this writing, in mid-2016, in what year, since the beginning of the instrumental 
temperature record, was the average global surface temperature highest? 
2) In what year prior to that was the average global surface temperature highest? 
 
These seem like simple questions, with simple answers, to be answered straightforwardly by 
appeal to readily available data. However, as we shall see, things are a bit more complicated, and 
the bearing of the data on those two questions was interestingly different. 
 
Let’s start with question (1).  In January 2016, most major news sources published stories to the 
effect that 2015 shattered all previous temperature records; that is, that the global mean surface 
temperature for that year was the highest since the beginning of the instrumental record. These 
reports followed upon analyses of temperature data from four major sources: the Japan 
Meteorological Association (JMA), the NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies (GISS), the 
U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the Climatic Research Unit 
(CRU) at the University of East Anglia.  On January 20, 2016, NASA and NOAA issued a joint 
press release, whose first sentence reads,  
 
Earth’s 2015 surface temperatures were the warmest since modern record keeping 
began in 1880, according to independent analyses by NASA and the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). 
 
This was accompanied by a press conference in which Gavin Schmidt, Director of NASA’s 
Goddard Institute for Space Studies, and Thomas Karl, Director of NOAA’s National Centers for 
Environmental Agencies, presented the findings of their two agencies.  On the same day, the UK 
Met Office issued a press release, beginning. 
 
Provisional full-year figures for global average temperatures reveal that 2015 was 
the warmest year in a record dating back to 1850. 
 
These were followed by a release from the World Meterological Organization (WMO), on 
January 25, 2016, synthesizing results of the GISS, NOAA, and CRU datasets. 
 
On to the second question.  A year earlier, in January 2015 most major news sources had reported 
that 2014 was the hottest year on record, following reports from the same agencies. The joint press 
release from NASA and NOAA that year, issued on January 16, 2015, NASA and NOAA, opened 
with, 
The year 2014 ranks as Earth’s warmest since 1880, according to two separate 
analyses by NASA and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) scientists. 
This was also accompanied by a press conference by Schmidt and Karl. 
 Given the near-identity of the opening sentences of the NASA/NOAA press releases regarding the 
two years 2014 and 2015, readers may be wondering why I say that these two years are 
interestingly different. The similarity between these two statements obscures an interesting nuance 
regarding the 2014 record, which came out in the more detailed presentation by Schmidt and Karl 
at the press conference, and which is reflected in the more cautious statement from the Met Office, 
on January 26, 2015, announcing the results of analysis of the CRU data for 2014. 
 
The  HadCRUT4 dataset (compiled by the Met Office and the University of East 
Anglia's Climatic Research Unit) shows last year was 0.56C (±0.1C*) above the 
long-term (1961-1990) average. 
 
Nominally this ranks 2014 as the joint warmest year in the record, tied with 2010, 
but the uncertainty ranges mean it's not possible to definitively say which of several 
recent years was the warmest. 
 
What was the difference? All four data sets agreed that the best estimate of global mean surface 
temperature for 2014 was higher than the best estimate for any previous year in the instrumental 
record.  But such estimates are surrounded by some uncertainty. Moreover, the top candidates, 
prior to 2015, for warmest year, are very close in global mean temperature, and the differences are 
within measurement uncertainty.  Figure 1 is a slide from the Schmidt/Karl press briefing of 
January 20 2015, depicting probabilities arrived at by NOAA and NASA for the truth of claims 
that this or that year was the warmest. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
 Figure 2 shows probability density functions for temperature of various years (all the record-
brakers), provided by Schmidt in a follow-up blog post (Schmidt 2015). 
 
 
Figure 2 
A few things are worth noting.  First is that, on both NASA’s and NOAA’s probability estimates, 
2014 is more likely than any other year to be the hottest year.  Second, on both probability 
estimates, it is more likely that 2014 is not the hottest year than that it is.  Third, though the 
probability rankings produced by NASA and NOAA agree on the ordering of the top three years, 
the probabilities assigned to these years differs significantly, in  some case by as much as 0.10. 
 
In spite of the fact that, on both their analyses, this statement is less probable than its negation, 
NOAA/NASA decided to make in their joint press release a categorical statement that 2014 was 
the hottest year on record, saving the more nuanced message for the more detailed briefing. I do 
not wish to question their decision, which may have been the right one; as Schmidt put it, “Records 
are bigger stories than trends.” As he noted in his follow-up blog post, the question of whether 
2014, 2010, 2005, or some other years was the warmest (by a slim margin) to date is of little 
importance, certainly less important than the unequivocal fact (on which all the analyses agreed) 
that the warming trend was continuing, with no signs of abating. 
 
As we have seen, the Met Office adopted a more cautious strategy in its press release.  The press 
release from the WMO, summarizing the results from the three datasets, adopted a mixed strategy: 
 
The representatives of the scientific teams that collected and analyzed the data found themselves 
with a complex epistemic situation to communicate. The question of what to communicate 
involved a trade-off: a categorical statement to the effect that 2014 broke a record is easy to grasp 
and lends itself to headlines but does not accurately the epistemic nuances of the situation; as we 
have seen, different groups made different choices. 
 
I would like to highlight a few things.  One is that a categorical statement that 2014 was, at the 
time, the hottest year on record was misleading, though it could be argued that, since a mistaken 
belief about this matter was of little consequence, it was not harmfully misleading (if, on the other 
hand, some decision of great import would be taken whose consequences would depend on 
whether or not it was true that 2014 was the warmest years, then, presumably, the statement would 
have been considerably more hedged).  Another is that, if gradations of belief are to be expressed, 
there was not available a unique epistemic probability function; the analyses of NOAA and NASA 
differed considerably in the values of the probabilities assigned to various statements.  What they 
opted to report, instead, was both probability distributions. 
 
2.2. Reporting the outcomes of controlled trials. There are news reports almost daily of the 
form: Scientists have found a link between A and B.  What this typically means is that a controlled 
trial was performed. Subjects were divided randomly into a test group and a control group. The 
test group was subjected to intervention A and the control group was not. Test and control groups 
were then evaluated as to presence of B.  What is being reported is that the experimenters found a 
difference, with respect to B, between test and control group, that exceeds some conventional level 
of statistical significance, usually either 0.05 or 0.01.  What this means is: on the assumption of 
the null hypothesis that A is irrelevant to B, the probability of finding a difference with respect to 
B that is at least as large as the difference found is less than 0.05 (or 0.01, or whatever significance 
level is used). 
 
The standard way of reporting trials of this sort is misleading, in that it suggests that one can 
conclude, on the basis of such a test, that there is a link, causal or otherwise, between A and B.  
What the evidence actually warrants is something much weaker.  To see this, consider that using 
a significance level of 0.05 as the threshold for reporting a positive result is to employ a test that 
has a false-positive rate of 5%, or 1 in twenty. If a large number of such trials is being done, and 
if the vast majority of interventions tested are ineffectual, then most experiments that yield a 
statistically significant result will be false positives.  This rather elementary point seems difficult 
to convey, and, even if the conclusions of the papers in scientific journals are appropriately hedged, 
the way they are reported in the media. For a detailed analysis, see  John Ioannidis, “Why Most 
Published Research Findings are False” (Ioannidis 2005). 
 
If results are reported in a way that suggests that a statistically significant result proves, or makes 
it reasonable to believe that there is a connection between the variables investigated, then, indeed, 
most claims of this sort are false. But how should the results of such studies be reported? If there 
are well-defined priors—that is, if there were a clear answer to how likely one should regard it, 
before testing, that, say, a given drug is effective—then one could update such priors in light of 
the evidence and report a posterior probability that the drug is effective. 
 
These two examples illustrate a point that could abundantly be illustrated by other examples, 
namely, that, in a host of cases, present the state of scientific knowledge on a given topic in the 
form of a list of propositions accepted and rejected is too crude. Further, representing shades of 
credibility via probability assignments will also distort the state of things, insofar as it suggests 
there is a unique correct degree of belief in a given proposition, given the evidence. 
 
 
3. Is Acceptance acceptable? The issues that our examples bring to the fore were the topic of 
discussion among the statisticians who were the founders of current practices of statistical 
hypothesis testing, with Neyman and Pearson, and Wald, on the one hand, formulating decision 
procedures for accepting and rejecting hypotheses, and Fisher roundly criticizing them for doing 
so.  The debate migrated into the philosophy of science literature in the 1950s, with Richard Jeffrey 
(1956) arguing, contra Churchman (1948), Braithwaite (1953), and Rudner (1953) that scientists 
ought not to engage in acceptance and rejection of hypotheses, on much the same grounds as 
Fisher.  Since then, the debate has continued, with Levi (1960, 1967, 1970, 1984), Kyburg (1968), 
Hempel (1965, 1981), and Maher (1993), among others, advocating acceptance, and Carnap (1968, 
1971), Rosencrantz (1977), Jeffrey (1970, 1991), among others, on the other side. 
 After briefly reviewing the debate, we will propose a limited role for acceptance, along the lines 
advocated by Myrvold (2011), which has similarities to the role proposed by Frankish (2004) and 
Sargent (2009).    
 
 
3.1 Background in statistical debates: Fisher and Neyman-Pearson.  The modern theory of 
statistical hypothesis testing has its roots in the work of Galton and  Karl Pearson.  Fisher made 
seminal advances in the early decades of the twentieth century, and, building on Fisher’s work, 
Jerzy Neyman and Karl Pearson’s son Egon Pearson (1928, 1933) developed the theory into 
(something like) the form found in textbooks today (see Lehmann 2011 for some of the history).  
Fisher introduced the use of what we now call p-values as tests of statistical significance.  The idea 
is to consider the probability distribution of some appropriate function of the data, adopted as a 
test statistic, on the supposition of some hypothesis H0.   We consider the “tail probabilities,” that 
is, for any value of the test statistic, the probability, conditional on H0, of obtaining a value that is 
at least as extreme as the one obtained.  This probability, now known as a p-value, is regarded as 
an indication of the level of significance of the result obtained. In an influential passage, Fisher 
wrote, 
 
If P is between .1 and .9 there is certainly no reason to suspect the hypothesis 
tested. If it is below .02 it is strongly indicated that the hypothesis fails to account 
for the whole of the facts. We shall not often be astray if we draw a conventional 
line at .05 and consider that higher values of χ2 indicate a real discrepancy. (1925, 
p. ?) 
 
Fisher’s method does not provide a uniform prescription for picking out, from the space of possible 
values of a given test statistic, an appropriate “tail region,” or a clear rationale for choosing one 
reason over another, though in the examples considered by Fisher there seems to be a clear natural 
choice.  It is this lacuna that Neyman and Pearson sought to fill.  In the problem setting considered 
by Neyman and Pearson, we have a hypothesis, H0, to be compared with one or more alternative 
hypotheses.  Data is gathered, and a decision is to be made whether or not to reject the hypothesis 
H0 on the basis of the data.  Neyman and Pearson’s innovation is to think of the choice of a 
statistical decision procedure as a task involving a trade-off between the risks of two potential 
errors; Type I errors, which consist of rejecting H0 when it is true, and Type II errors, those of 
failure to reject H0 when one of the alternatives considered is true. 
 
Neyman and Pearson were clear that the choice of a decision procedure could not be made 
uniformly, without consideration of the costs associated with the two types of errors. 
 
 Let us now for a moment consider the form in which judgments are made in practical 
experience. We may accept or we may reject a hypothesis with varying degrees of 
confidence; or we may decide to remain in doubt. But whatever conclusion is reached 
the following position must be recognized.  If we reject H0, we may reject it when it is 
true; if we accept H0, we may be accepting it when it is false, that is to say, when really 
some alternative Ht is true.  These two sources of error can rarely be eliminated 
completely in some cases it will be more important to avoid the first, in others the 
second.  We are reminded of the old problem considered by LAPLACE of the number 
of votes in a court of judges that should be needed to convict a prisoner. Is it more 
serious to convict an innocent man or to acquit a guilty? That will depend on the 
consequences of the error; is the punishment death or fine; what is the danger to the 
community of released criminals; what are the current ethical views on punishment? 
From the point of view of mathematical theory all that we can do is to show how the 
risk of the errors may be controlled and minimised. The use of these statistical tools in 
any given case, in determining how the balance should be struck, must be left to the 
investigator (1933, 295–296). 
 
This is the argument from what Heather Douglas (2000) has called “inductive risk.” 
 
Textbooks on statistics vary in the extent to which this message is taken to heart.  The best 
textbooks (e.g. Lehmann 1959 and subsequent editions) include a passage of this sort.  
Unfortunately, practice has been to adopt fixed p-values as criteria of significance, without regard 
to the particular risks associated with the two types of error (a practice that has garnered extensive 
criticism), and Fisher’s suggested convention of p = 0.05 as indicating a significant result has, 
despite Fisher’s frank acknowledgment of its arbitrariness, been widely adopted. 
 
One thing that Neyman and Pearson don’t tell us is how to balance the risk of the two types of 
error.  If we are to use an expected utility analysis, then more is needed than the two error 
probabilities and the costs associated with each type of error; we also need prior probabilities for 
the two hypotheses.  An alternative was suggested by Abraham Wald (1949, 1950), who 
introduced a minimax procedure. 
 
Although Neyman and Pearson thought of themselves as elaborating on Fisher’s work, the key 
move, that of adopting a decision procedure for acceptance and rejection based on balancing of 
the risks of the two types of errors, was one that Fisher was not willing to follow them on.  In an 
essay, “Statistical Methods and Scientific Induction,” published in 1955, and also in his 1956 book, 
Staistical Methods and Scientific Inference, Fisher sharply criticized “[t]he attempt to reinterpret 
the common tests of significance used in scientific research as though they constituted some kind 
of acceptance procedure and led to ‘decisions,’ in Wald’s sense” (1955, 69); he also added a brief 
section, 12.1, to the seventh edition (1960) of The Design of Experiments.   His chief criticism is 
that, though acceptance procedures are needed and are useful in industrial settings, in which there 
is a single decision to be made on the basis of the statistical information obtained, such as whether 
or not to accept a consignment of manufactured goods as free of defects.  This is all well and good 
in such contexts, Fisher says, and “I am thankful, whenever I travel by air, that the high level of 
precision and reliability required can really be achieved by such means.”  However, he continues, 
things are different in the natural sciences; “the logical differences between such an operation and 
the work of scientific discovery by physical or biological experimentation seem to me so wide that 
the analogy between them is not helpful, and the identification of the two sorts of operation is 
decidedly misleading” (p. 70). 
 
The reason for the difference is the open-ended nature of the use to which information will be put 
in the natural sciences; in contrast to the single decision to be made in the industrial context, a 
multitude of decisions may be made on the basis of the information obtained, and, precisely 
because of the sensitivity of the choice of an appropriate acceptance criterion on what is at stake 
in the case of error, no one decision procedure will suffice for all these uses. 
  
Finally, in inductive inference we introduce no cost functions for faulty judgements, 
for it is recognized in scientific research that the attainment of, or failure to attain 
to, a particular scientific advance this year rather than later, has consequences, both 
to the research programme, and to advantageous applications of scientific 
knowledge, which cannot be foreseen. In fact, scientific research is not geared to 
maximize the profits of any particular organization, but is rather an attempt to 
improve public knowledge undertaken as an act of faith to the effect that, as more 
becomes known, or more surely known, the intelligent pursuit of a great variety of 
aims, by a great variety of men, and groups of men, will be facilitated. We make no 
attempt to evaluate these consequences, and do not assume that they are capable of 
evaluation in any sort of currency. 
 
When decision is needed it is the business of inductive inference to evaluate the 
nature and extent of the uncertainty with which the decision is encumbered. 
Decision itself must properly be referred to a set of motives, the strength or 
weakness of which should have had no influence whatever on any estimate of 
probability. We aim, in fact, at methods of inference which should be equally 
convincing to all rational minds, irrespective of any intentions they may have in 
utilizing the knowledge inferred. 
 
We have the duty of formulating, of summarising, and of communicating our 
conclusions, in intelligible form, in recognition of the right of other free minds to 
utilize them in making their own decisions. (1955, 77). 
 
Though, for Fisher, it is not the place of the scientific researcher to introduce cost functions, he is 
not advocating a picture in which scientists are absolved from considerations of the impact of their 
work on society.  Rather, the idea is that it will be most beneficial to the public if scientists refrain 
from introducing criteria for acceptance and rejection of hypotheses, precisely because such 
criteria must involve consideration of the cost of error, and the application of the scientists’ work 
may well extend well beyond circumstances those scientists can foresee, and involve costs that 
they are not in a position to estimate. Far from being a picture on which scientists are absolved 
from bringing ethical considerations to bear on their work; on this view, it is their duty to 
communicate as clearly as they can the results of their work, including communication of the 
extent of uncertainty involved. 
 
 
3.2 The acceptance debate in philosophy of science. Following Wald, Braithwaite (1953) 
advocated a minimax decision procedure. [Say something about Churchman.]  Richard Rudner, 
citing Neyman, used the dependence of statistical decision procedures on the risks associated with 
error to argue that “The Scientist qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments” (1953).   
 
In an early paper (Jeffrey 1956), written while he was still a graduate student, Richard C. Jeffrey 
weighed in, taking the Fisherian line against Braithwaite, Churchman, and Rudner. Jeffrey’s 
argument is couched as a reductio of the claim that it is the task of a scientist to accept or reject 
hypotheses.  If the scientist accepts or rejects hypotheses, then Rudner is correct that the criteria 
for acceptance and rejection will depend on what is at stake.  However, it is rarely the case that a 
single decision will be based on the scientific evidence; the same study might be used to decide 
whether a given drug is safe for use on humans, or whether it may be used for animals, and one 
might demand a higher standard of assurance of safety for accepting its use on humans than on 
animals.  Merely reporting acceptance or rejection will, in such a case, lead to some decisions 
being made in a less-than-optimal way.   
 
Jeffrey summarizes the argument in the concluding section, 
 
On the Churchman-Braithwaite-Rudner view it is the task of the scientist as such 
to accept and reject hypotheses in such a way as to maximize the expectation of 
good for, say, a community for which he is acting. On the other hand, our 
conclusion is that if the scientist is to maximize good he should refrain from 
accepting or rejecting hypotheses, since he cannot possibly do so in such away 
as to optimize every decision which may be made on the basis of those 
hypotheses. 
 
In this early paper (and in his dissertation, completed in the following year), we find an 
adumbration of the position that Jeffrey would later call “radical probabilism,” which was to be a 
guiding theme of his career.  This is a view that rejects the centrality of epistemic attitudes such as 
acceptance or rejection of propositions and replaces them, instead, by probabilities reflecting an 
agent’s judgment of the credibility of a hypothesis.  It is radical probabilism because Jeffrey does 
not require such judgments to be grounded in certainty about anything.  Rudner’s argument 
afforded Jeffrey an opportunity to argue against the notion that scientists accept and reject 
hypotheses, because, according to Jeffrey, the very considerations of value that Rudner invokes 
should lead Rudner to reject his premise that scientists accept and reject hypotheses. 
 
Because Jeffrey was replying, in part, to a paper entitled “The Scientist qua Scientist Makes Value 
Judgments,” one might expect him to be arguing for the negation of this, and indeed, he has been 
read in this way.1  But this claim forms no part of his argument, which can go through without 
commitment on this matter one way in the other, and nowhere in his paper does deny Rudner’s 
titular thesis, but, instead, remains neutral on it;  note that in the above-quoted passage we have “if 
the scientist is to maximize good ….”  But if we do accept the premise that is permissible for a 
scientist to perform her job in the way that is most useful to society,2 then considerations of value 
lead to the conclusion that, since any other procedure would lead to suboptimal decisions, the 
scientist should refrain from accepting or rejecting hypotheses. 
 
If the argument were intended as an argument for the thesis that a scientist made be absolved from 
the responsibility of making value judgements, it is, as Douglas points out, ill-suited for doing so.  
The scientist qua scientist makes decisions, and the process of decision-making doesn’t get off the 
                                                 
1 The first to do so seems to have been Levi (1960).  Heather Douglas (2009), in an influential discussion of Jeffrey, 
counts Jeffrey among those who argued for a vision of science isolated from broad social concerns, and this reading 
has become a prevalent one.  
2 And, seriously, who doesn’t? 
ground without considerations of the good or bad of potential consequences of decisions. The 
process of experimentation involves a multitude of decisions, as does the choice of procedures 
used to analyze the data, and, at the end of all that, there is the choice of what to publish and how. 
 
There is a problem for radical probabilism, raised by Rudner, which Jeffrey at this early stage does 
not know how to answer.  That is that the scientist must nevertheless accept a determinate 
probability judgment.  Is the would-be radical probabilist not sure of something after all, namely, 
her own probability judgments? 
 
The problem shifts in Jeffrey’s later work.  In The Logic of Decision (1965) is presented a system 
that uses an agent’s preferences between acts to attribute to her both judgments of desirability 
(value judgments) and judgments of probability.  The agent’s preferences are permitted to be a 
partial order; there may be pair of acts between which she neither has a preference nor is committed 
to regarding as equally good; she just doesn’t know what to say when asked which is better.  As a 
consequence, the representation theorem used by Jeffrey does not yield unique probability 
judgments.  The belief state of an agent is, rather, a set of probability judgments. 
 
This can be thought of as representing a sort of second-order uncertainty, uncertainty about what 
probability to assign to a given proposition.  This eliminates the need for acceptance of judgments 
about particular probability values, but, obviously, only pushes the problem up one level; the agent, 
it seems, accepts a certain definite set of probability functions. 
 
The correct response, I think, is that to have a belief state is not the same as accepting a proposition 
to the effect that this is my belief state, any more than to have a preference between two options is 
equivalent to accepting a proposition to the effect that one is more desirable than the other.  A 
radical probabilist need not accept any statements other than logical truths with certainty, even 
statements about her own belief state. 
 
But a related problem comes up in the context of communication.  Suppose we agree that in cases 
of non-negligible uncertainty the epistemic situation is one in which communicating probability 
assignment is more appropriate than communicating an assertion of acceptance.  As we have seen 
in our first example, there might be second-order uncertainty, about which probability assignment 
is most appropriate. We will return to this matter in section 4. 
 
 
3.3 A limited role for acceptance.  There are statements that I regard as so well established that 
any reasonable person’s credence will be, though strictly less than 1, so close to 1 as to make no 
difference in any decision that any of us is likely to encounter.  For such decisions, there is no 
harm in labelling them as simply accepted, and there is considerable gain, in relieving ourselves 
of the cognitive burden of estimating just how high our credence in such propositions is, and to 
avoid cluttering up our communications with assessments of the credibility. 
 
For example: Standard equilibrium statistical mechanics, applied to a gas, attributes nonzero 
probabilities to all sorts of pressure fluctuations.  Small fluctuations are rare, and can be observed; 
larger fluctuations, though rarer, still have a nonzero probability.  Whether or not I have full 
confidence in standard equilibrium statistical mechanics, if I have nonzero credence that these 
calculations are even approximately correct, I have a miniscule, though nonzero, credence that in 
the next three minutes all the air in this room will squeeze itself in a a cubic centimetre in the upper 
left-hand corner. 
 
How small? I don’t know.  I could work it out, if need be, but there’s no need to bother; it’s small 
enough to be completely, utterly, negligible for all practical purposes.  No decision that I expect 
to make will be made any differently than it would if my credence in such an eventuality were 
actually zero. 
 
If someone asks me what will happen to an inflated bicycle tire that has a hole in it, I will reply, 
simply, that it will deflate.  There is no need to hedge or qualify this assertion with an estimate of 
the statistical mechanical probability that the tire will remain inflated, as this probability is so small 
as to be completely negligible. 
 
 
4. The representation of an epistemic state: Good’s hierarchy.  For some propositions, namely, 
those for which there is no harm in neglecting uncertainty, we may represent an agent’s state of 
belief as including that proposition as provisionally accepted (bearing in mind that, in the light of 
new evidence, the uncertainty might become relevant again). 
 
Should we, then, represent a state of uncertainty by a probability assignment, representing the 
degree to which belief in various propositions is warranted by the evidence? 
 
It would be absurd to suppose that we will ever be in a position to settle on a completely precise 
probability assignment that we can reasonably regard as uniquely the best in a given situation.  As 
I. J. Good puts it, “it would only be a joke if you were to say that the probability of rain tomorrow 
(however sharply defined) is 0.3057876289” ([1979] 1983, 95).    
 
Now, weather forecasters do not, of course, issue probability estimates to 10 decimal places; 
typically we get integral percentages.  For the sorts of decisions to be made on the basis of those 
forecasts, that is all that is needed; would the difference between 37% probability of rain and a 
38% probability of rain make any difference to your behaviour? 
 
Where the uncertainty matters, it will be useful to provide an interval range of probability 
estimates, or, even better, a second-order probability function, indicating, for any interval, the 
degree to which one can be confident that the optimal probability estimate is in that interval.  This 
could be useful in conveying, for example, the fact that, as one goes further into the future, one 
becomes less confident that one has gotten the probability right. 
 
But of, course, one might be uncertain about what the best choice of a second-order distribution 
is, and so consider a third-order distribution, and so on, as recommended by Good (1952, 1979).  
We should not expect the regress to be terminated at some level with a probability function that is 
entirely determinate; rather, one would expect that, the higher one goes up the hierarchy, the harder 
it will be to uniquely specify a probability function.    
 
It might seem that this inevitably lands us in a hopeless infinite regress.  This might make things 
seem hopeless.  It need not, though; as Good remarked in a discussion of decision making with a 
hierarchical representation of belief states, 
 
the higher the type the woollier the probabilities. It will be found, however, that the higher 
the type the less the woolliness matters, provided that the complications do not become 
too complicated ([1952] 1983, 14). 
 
Considerations of the cost (in complication of the analysis) of continuing further up the hierarchy, 
compared with benefit (in terms of improved decisions) can indicate an end to the analysis.  In 
connection with this, Good remarked, 
 
Isaac Levi (1973, p. 23) says, “Good is prepared to define second order 
probability distributions … and third order probability distributions over these, 
etc. until he gets tired.” This was funny, but it would be more accurate to say 
that I stop when the guessed expected utility of going further becomes negative 
if the cost is taken into account. ([1979] 1983, 99). 
 
 
5. Values and context of reporting.   The decision of whether to publish the results of a scientific 
investigation, and, if so, what to publish, is a context in which ethical considerations clearly have 
a role to play, as well as considerations such as impact on others and on the scientist’s own career.  
Typically, the decision to publish involves a decision that publication would be beneficial to 
someone—society at large, the scientist’s employer, or the scientist herself (and in the best case, 
all three).  There needs be sufficient motivation for publication to compensate for the cost in time 
and effort associated with doing so. 
 
That ethical considerations regarding whether to publish have a legitimate role to play is most 
easily seen in extraordinary situations; for example, cases in which knowledge could be used to do 
harm.   
 
Consider, then, the sort of decision facing a researcher who has done some research and is 
deliberating about what to publish.  Alice has done some researched on a certain topic, and has 
arrived at what she regards as well-informed credences on that topic, expressed either as a 
probability function, or a second order probability, function, or whatever is most appropriate.  She 
is tasked with reporting her credences.  Other agents will be making some decisions on the basis 
of Alice’s report. 
 
In the simplest case, all the agents have the same value-judgments, and the decisions that they will 
make, if they adopt Alice’s reported credences, are exactly the decisions that Alice will endorse.  
Alice has no incentive to do anything other than report the credences she has arrived at, in the form 
she deems most valuable. 
 
This sort of case is rarely, if ever, realized.  In the more interesting case, among those who will be 
utilizing Alice’s report will be some who have different goals than Alice. 
 
One thing that Alice could do might be to try to manipulate these others into making decisions that 
she would prefer, rather than the decisions that they themselves would prefer on an honest 
assessment of the evidence.  Under some circumstances this might be morally permissible; for 
example, in a time of war it may be morally acceptable to attempt to mislead or misinform the 
enemy. 
 
But in a situation of democratic deliberation, in which all agents are expected to respect each 
other’s right to make an informed choice, whether or not they themselves endorse this choice, this 
would be regarded as an impermissible betrayal of trust, if Alice has accepted a societal role as a 
source of expert judgment.   We would ask Alice to set aside her own personal preferences and 
report her honest assessment of the evidence.  That is, Alice would be expected to respect the 
following. 
 
Principle of trust.  A person who has accepted a societal role as a source of expert 
opinion has a duty to honestly report her judgments. 
 
Typically, we think of independent scientists as having a role in society that subjects them to the 
principle of trust, and hence to judge those who violate it to be guilty of a violation of professional 
ethics.  Journalists have traditionally been thought to occupy such a role (hence the slogan, 
“without fear or favour”).  A salesperson or corporate spokesperson is not thought of as occupying 
such a role, and their opinions taken with a grain of salt.  This is the reason that PR firms find it 
useful to adopt the “Third Man” strategy, of representing their client’s point of view as if it came 
from an independent source (see Rampton & Stauber 2001), and it is the reason that scientists who 
play that role are rightly regarded as betraying a role responsibility. 
 
Suppose a scientist accepts the principle of trust.  What does this entail, in terms of what is to be 
reported? 
 
It entails, in the context of communication, careful consideration of what will be most valuable to 
the intended recipients, in forming their own judgments (which may be different from the 
scientist’s) about what the best course of action is, in terms of what is known, and the degree and 
kind of uncertainty involved. 
 
In some cases a proposition may be so well established on the basis of the evidence that every 
well-informed, reasonable person will make decisions as if it were true. 
 
In other cases, this will not be the case, but (as in the case of weather forecasting), there may be 
well-established procedures that yield estimates of probability that are sufficiently determinate that 
any second-order uncertainty about what the best estimate can safely be neglected by all those who 
might be making decisions on their basis.  In such cases, statements of probability estimates are 
appropriate. 
 
In other cases, there may be genuine uncertainty about what the best probability estimate is, but 
well-defined procedures for estimating second-order uncertainty. 
 
But what about cases in which it is known that there is uncertainty, but no well-defined procedure 
for estimating the extent of this uncertainty?  This, for example, is the situation that obtains in 
assessing degree of uncertainty regarding climate projections yielded by global climate models 
(See IPCC AR5 WGI Ch. 12 .  A case can be made that existing tools are inadequate (see Section 
7, below).  This is a case in which philosophers could contribute to the development of improved 
techniques for assessing and reporting uncertainty. 
 
6. Conclusion.  Where to go from here?  The hierarchical model sketched in section 4 has, I 
claim, the advantage that it is friendly to a principled pluralism of techiques for reporting an 
epistemic state.  When a statement is sufficiently well-established, or the costs of error sufficiently 
slight, one may make a categorical statement.  Where there is more uncertainty, or in situations in 
which the information may be applied to a variety of situations, with varying cost functions, a 
statement of probability may be in order, if there are grounds for assessing one.  In other situations, 
a range of probabilities is appropriate… and so on. 
 
Some readers will find this machinery artificial and cumbersome.  Very good! I hope that they will 
be moved to construct something better. 
  
 References 
 
Braithwaite, R. B. (1953).  Scientific Explanation : A Study of the Function of Theory, Probability, 
and Law in Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Carnap, Rudolf (1968). “On rules of acceptance,” in Lakatos, ed., 146–150. 
 
——— (1971).  “Inductive Logic and Rational Decisions,” in R. Carnap and R. C. Jeffrey, eds., 
Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Vol. I (Los Angeles: University of California 
Press), 5–31.  
 
Churchman, C. West (1948). Theory of Experimental Inference.  New York: MacMillan & Co. 
 
Douglas, Heather E. (2000). “Inductive risk and values in science.” Philosophy of Science, 67, 
559–579. 
 
——— (2009). Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal. Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburgh 
Press. 
 
Fisher, Ronald A. (1955). “Statistical Methods and Scientific Induction.” Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society, Series B 17, 69–78. 
 
——— (1956). Statistical Methods and Scientific Inference. Oxford: Hafner Publishing Co. 
 
Frankish, K. (2004). “Partial belief and flat-out belief,” in F. Huber & C. Schmidt-Petri, eds., 
Degrees of belief: An anthology  (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 75–93. 
 
Good, I.J. (1952). “Rational Decisions.” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B 14, 107–
114.  Reprinted in Good (1983), 3–14. 
 
——— (1979). “Some History of the Hierarchical Bayesian Methodology,” in J. M. Bernardo, et 
al., eds., Bayesian Statistics (Valencia: University of Valencia Press), 489–515.  Reprinted in 
Good (1983), 95–105. 
 
———  (1983). Good Thinking: The Foundations of Probability and its Applications.  
Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press.   
 
Hempel, Carl G. (1965). “Coherence and Morality.” The Journal of Philosophy 62, 539-542, 
 
——— . (1981). “Turns in the Evolution of the Problem of Induction.” Synthese 46, 389–404.  
Reprinted in Hempel (2001), 344–356. 
 
——— (1983). “Valuation and Objectivity in Science,” in R. S. Cohen and L. Laudan, eds., 
Physics, Philosophy, and Psychoanalysis:  Essays in Honor of Adolf Grünbaum (Dordrecht: 
D. Reidel Publishing Company), 73–100.  Reprinted in Hempel (2001), 372–396. 
 ——— (2001). The Philosophy of Carl G. Hempel., ed. James H. Fetzer.  Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Ioannidis, John P.A. (2005). “Why  Most Published Research Findings are False.” PLoS Medicine 
2, 696–701. 
 
Jeffrey, Richard C. (1956).  “Valuation and Acceptance of Scientific Hypotheses.”  Philosophy of 
Science 23, 237–246.  Reprinted in Jeffrey (1992), 14–29. 
 
——— (1965). The Logic of Decision.  New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company. 
 
——— (1970). “Dracula Meets Wolfman: Acceptance vs. Partial Belief,” in Swain, ed., 157–184. 
 
——— (1992).  Probability and the Art of Judgment.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Knutti, Reto, David Masson, and Andrew Gettleman (2013). “Climate Model Genealogy: 
Generation CMIP5 and How We Got There.” Geophysical Research Letters 40, 1184–1199. 
 
Kyburg, Henry (1968).  “The Rule of Detachment in Inductive Logic,” in Lakatos, ed., 98–119. 
 
Lakatos, Imre, ed. (1968).  The Problem of Inductive Logic: Proceedings of the International 
Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, London, 1965, volume 2.  Amsterdam: North-
Holland Company. 
 
Lehmann, Erich L. (1959). Testing Statistical Hypotheses. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
 
———  (2011). Fisher, Neyman, and the Creation of Classical Statistics. Berlin: Springer. 
 
Levi, Isaac (1960).  “Must the Scientist Make Value Judgments?” The Journal of Philosophy 57, 
345–357. 
 
——— (1967).  Gambling with Truth: An Essay on Induction and the Aims of Science.  Cambridge: 
The MIT Press. 
 
——— (1970). “Probability and Evidence,” in Swain, ed., 134–156. 
 
——— (1976). “Acceptance Revisited,” in Radu J. Bogdan, ed. Local Induction.  Dordrecht: D. 
Reidel Publishing Company. 
 
——— (1984).  Decisions and Revisions: Philosophical essays on knowledge and value. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Maher, Patrick (1993).  Betting on Theories.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Met Office, “2014 one of the warmest years on record globally.”  Press release, 26 January 2015. 
http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/news/release/archive/2015/2014-global-temperature 
 
Myrvold, Wayne C. (2012).  Epistemic Values and the Value of Learning.” Synthese 87 547–568. 
 
NASA (2015). “NASA, NOAA Find 2014 Warmest Year in Modern Record.”  Press Release, 
January 16, 2015.http://www.nasa.gov/press/2015/january/nasa-determines-2014-warmest-
year-in-modern-record/ 
 
NASA (2016).   “NASA, NOAA Analyses Reveal Record-Shattering Global Warm Temperatures 
in 2015.” http://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-noaa-analyses-reveal-record-shattering-
global-warm-temperatures-in-2015 
 
Neyman, J., and E.S. Pearson (1928). “On the Use and Interpretation of Certain Test Criteria.” 
Biometrika 20A, 175–240, 263–295. 
 
——— (1933). “On the Problem of the Most Efficient Tests of Statistical Hypotheses.” 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Series A 231, 289–337. 
 
Rampton. Sheldon, and John Stauber (2001), Trust Us, We’re Experts. Penguin. 
 
Rosencrantz, Roger (1977).  Inference, Method, and Decision: Towards a Bayesian Philosophy of 
Science.  Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company. 
 
Sargent, M. (2009). “Answering the Bayesian challenge.” Erkenntnis 70, 237–252. 
 
Schmidt, Gavin (2015). “Thoughts on 2014 and ongoing temperature trends.”  Blog post, Real 
Climate, 22 January 2015. http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2015/01/thoughts-
on-2014-and-ongoing-temperature-trends/ 
 
Schmidt, Gavin A., and Thomas R, Karl (2015). “NOAA/NASA Global Analysis for 2014.” 
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/briefings/201501.pdf 
 
Swain, Marshall, ed., (1970).  Induction, Acceptance, and Partial Belief.  Dordrecht: Reidel. 
 
Tokyo Climate Center, Japan Meteorological Agency (2015).  “State of Global Warming in 2014.”  
TCC News 39, Winter 2015.  http://ds.data.jma.go.jp/tcc/tcc/news/tccnews39.pdf 
 
——— (2016). “State of the Global Warming in 2015.” TCC News 43, Winter 2016. 
http://ds.data.jma.go.jp/tcc/tcc/news/tccnews43.pdf 
 
Wald, Abraham (1949). “Statistical Decision Functions.” Annals of Mathematical Statistics 20, 
165–205. 
  
——— (1950). Statistical Decision Functions.  New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
 
World Meteorological Organization (2015). “Warming Trend Continues in 2014.” 
http://public.wmo.int/en/media/press-release/warming-trend-continues-2014.  Published 2 
February 2015. 
 
——— (2016). “2015 is hottest year on record.” http://public.wmo.int/en/media/press-
release/2015-hottest-year-record. Published 25 January 2016. 
 
 
 
 
